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A NUMBER OF INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED technologies are now being used to support complex
decision-making in a range of contexts. This paper reports on a project undertaken to provide decision
support in discretionary legal domains by referring to a recently created model that involves the inter-
play and weighting of relevant rule-based and discretionary factors used in a decision-making process.
The case study used in the modelling process is the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Victorian Magistrate’s
Court (Australia), where the handing down of an appropriate custodial or non-custodial sentence
requires the consideration of many factors. Tools and techniques used to capture relevant expert
knowledge and to display it both as a paper model and as an online prototype application are dis-
cussed. Models of sentencing decision-making with rule-based and discretionary elements are pre-
sented and analyzed. This paper concludes by discussing the benefits and disadvantages of such
technology and considers some potential appropriate uses of the model and web-based prototype
application.
UN NOMBRE DE TECHNOLOGIES de pointe de plus en plus raffinées aident maintenant à la prise de
décisions complexes dans une grande diversité de contextes. Cet article fait le compte rendu d’un
projet mis en œuvre pour aider à la prise de décision dans des domaines juridiques discrétionnaires
et décrit un modèle récent qui prend en ligne de compte l’interaction et le mérite des facteurs fondés
sur les règles de droit et des facteurs de nature discrétionnaire qui sont pertinents dans la procédure
de la prise de décision. Cette étude de cas utilise la procédure de modélisation de juridiction pénale
de la Cour de magistrat victorienne (Australie), où l’ordonnance d’une peine carcérale ou non car-
cérale appropriée exige l’examen de plusieurs facteurs. L’article commente les outils et les techniques
utilisés pour faire un survol du savoir expert pertinent et exposer ce savoir à la fois sous forme d’un
imprimé et d’un prototype d’application électronique. Des modèles de décisions prises en matière
pénale à partir d’éléments de nature réglementaire et de nature discrétionnaire sont présentés et
analysés. En conclusion, l’article évalue les avantages et les désavantages de cette forme de tech-
nologie et explore certaines utilisations possibles appropriées du modèle et du prototype d’applica-
tion diffusé sur le Web.
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31. INTRODUCTION
DECISION-MAKING IN THE LEGAL DOMAIN is often a complex task that involves
gathering large amounts of information, analyzing issues, legislation and prece-
dents, as well as evaluating feasible options. This paper explores the use of arti-
ficial intelligence techniques to provide decision support by making reference to
a collaborative project that took place in Victoria, Australia in 2002 and 2003.
The project involved exploring, modelling and building a decision-support pro-
totype for the sentencing decisions made by magistrates in the Victorian
Magistrates, (criminal) jurisdiction. 
One of the central and perennial questions of sentencing law and schol-
arship is how lawmakers should strike an appropriate balance between consis-
tency and individualization in punishment. In some jurisdictions, including many
states in the United States and Australia, legislatures have increasingly moved
towards mandatory sentencing regimes, which attempt to maximize consistency
by minimizing judicial discretion—and hence individualization. In other jurisdic-
tions, such as Victoria, Australia where this project is based, legislatures contin-
ue to grant judges considerable discretion in sentencing. In these jurisdictions,
legislators have arguably favoured individualization over consistency. 
Even in these jurisdictions, however, it is desirable that like cases be
treated alike. From a retributivist perspective, a certain measure of consistency
is necessary to ensure that offenders are punished in at least rough proportion
to their culpability and thereby maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
criminal-justice process. From an economic/utilitarian perspective, consistency
enhances certainty of punishment, which, in turn, increases lawmakers’ ability to
pursue optimal levels of deterrence. We believe that the technology-based solu-
tions we propose in this paper can help to maximize consistency of process in
bounded discretion-sentencing regimes.1
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1. This paragraph is paraphrased from comments made by the original (and anonymous) reviewers of this article. 
The paper commences with a discussion of sentencing in the Victorian
Magistrates court. We then conduct an analysis of some of the difficulties in using
artificial intelligence techniques in discretionary legal domains and review some
previously published material on automated sentencing systems. We next
describe the methods and techniques that were used in the Victorian sentencing
project and present a selection of the models developed. The paper next dis-
cusses potential uses of these models and considers possible extensions to this
work. The paper concludes with an assessment of the benefits and limitations of
the project and its potential contribution to furthering an understanding of arti-
ficial intelligence decision support in discretionary legal domains.
1.1. Sentencing in the Victorian Magistrates’ (criminal) jurisdiction
The Sentencing Act 1991 of Victoria2 generally governs the sentencing guidelines
and penalties available in Victorian Magistrates’ Courts for people found guilty of
offences by Victorian Courts; the exception is the Children’s Court, which has its
own sentences.3 The 1991 Act was changed in important respects by the
Sentencing (Amendment) Act 1999, which includes the new sentencing option of
a deferral of the sentence and changes to the Victim Impact Statement procedures. 
Section 5(1) of the 1991 Act sets out the purposes of sentencing, which
are as follows: just punishment; deterrence of the defendant and of others from
committing similar offences; the establishment of conditions for the rehabilitation
of the defendant; denunciation of the defendant’s conduct; and the protection of
the community from the defendant.4 Section 5(2) requires magistrates making
sentencing orders to give regard to: the maximum penalty for the offence; current
sentencing practices; the nature and gravity of the offence; the defendant’s cul-
pability and degree of responsibility for the offence; whether the defendant has
pleaded guilty and at what stage such a plea was indicated; the defendant’s pre-
vious character; and the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors.5
Amendments to the 1991 Act require magistrates making sentencing
orders to take into account the personal circumstances of the victim and also any
injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence.6 Courts are also directed not
to impose a more severe penalty if a less severe penalty can achieve the sen-
tencing purpose.7 For example, the Court should consider imposing an intensive
correction order before imprisonment and a community-based order before an
intensive correction order.8
Sentencing orders can be grouped as follows: (a) imprisonment; (b)
intensive correction order; (c) suspended sentence; (d) community-based order;
(e) youth-training-centre order; (f) fine; (g) conviction; (h) adjournment or dis-
2. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic.) (amended to October 2004), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_act/
sa1991121/>.
3. Ibid., s. 4. 
4. Ibid., s. 5(1).
5. Ibid., s. 5(2).
6. Ibid., s.5(2)(da)–(db).
7. Ibid., s. (5)(3).
8. Ibid., s. 5(2E), 5(4)–5(5).
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charge; (i) non-conviction conditional adjournment with an undertaking or dis-
missal9; (j) a new sentence of deferral of sentence for defendants aged between
18 and 25 years10; and (k) other orders.11 Imprisonment orders are to be served
in full. The previous automatic remission of up to one third of the sentence was
abolished in 1992. Magistrates may sentence a defendant for up to two years for
a single offence12 and five years for aggregate offences.13 Magistrates may
impose one aggregate sentence of imprisonment for offences that are based on
the same facts or are of a similar character.14 Defendants ordered to serve more
than one term of imprisonment shall, unless otherwise ordered, serve such sen-
tences concurrently.15
The Sentencing (Victim Impact Statement) Act 199416 provides for mag-
istrates to have regard in sentencing defendants for the impact of their crime on
the victim. Crime victims are now allowed to make a victim-impact statement,
usually by means of a statutory declaration—and on occasions by sworn evi-
dence in court—which will contain details of their injury, loss or damage. The
Court must order a pre-sentence report before imposing an intensive-correction
order, a community-based order17 or a youth-training order18 and may order such
a report in any other case.19 The prosecutor or defence lawyer may file a notice
of intention to dispute the pre-sentence report with the Court, which allows evi-
dence to be led and cross-examined on the report.20
1.2. Sentencing and discretionary decision-making 
Lovegrove states that decision-making in sentencing raises weighty and contro-
versial matters. He claims that the prerequisites for good legal decision-making
require that judgments should be:
• individualized—as numerous matters relating to the circumstances of the
offence and the offender are potentially relevant to ensuring justice in
the individual case;
• consistent—as like cases are treated similarly and unlike cases differently; 
• coherent—as, given the premise that what is said is what is decided, it
follows that, when for instance a factor is said to be important, it is in
fact accorded substantial weight; and
• logical—as judgments, if they could be analyzed, would be found to
conform to an underlying logic (the alternative being arbitrariness) and
9. Ibid., s. 7(1).
10. Ibid., s. 7(2).
11. Ibid., s. 7(1).
12. Ibid., s. 113C.
13. Ibid., s. 113B.
14. Ibid., s. 9.
15. Ibid., s. 16(1).
16. Now incorporated into s. 85(2)(d) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic.), ibid.
17. Ibid., s. 96(2). However, under s. 39(7) a court is not required to order a pre-sentence report for a community-
based order whose only condition is a community service condition requiring 250 hours or less of work.
18. This order only applies to those who are 17 or more but under age 21 at the day of the court hearing.
19. Supra note 2, s. 96(1).
20. Ibid., s. 18K(1).
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as this is implicit in the basis of the appellate process which is set out in
House,21 a High Court judgment rendered by Dixon, Evatt and
McTiernan JJ.22
Lovegrove claims that what is at issue is how the best balance between
these four prerequisites is to be achieved.23 In Australian legal circles, two options
vie for prominence. One is that of judgment as an intuitive/instinctive synthesis
and the other is that of judgment by way of a more-or-less conscious and explic-
it framework and process. The concept of measuring what is consistent decision-
making is a vexed one. As we shall discuss later, legislators—particularly in North
America—have introduced mandatory sentencing laws, judicial sentencing guide-
lines and sentencing grids in order to attain consistency of outcomes. Almost all
decision-support systems for sentencing have been built with the judiciary as the
intended end-users. Furthermore, almost all provide a range of possible sen-
tences for a given offence. This project is novel in that the end-users are lawyers
and the desired outcome is an argument rather than a sentence. Hence we are
not concerned with considering the vexed issue of consistency of outcomes.
Rather, we are concerned with the consistency of approaches to decision-making
and the presentation of arguments to support decision-making. 
As Zdenkowski notes, while mandatory sentencing and sentencing grids
impose non-intuitive thinking upon sentencers, they are not concerned with
achieving better legal decision-making, but, rather are driven by law-and-order
populism.24 Lovegrove comments that, until the late 1980s, academics and
reform bodies tended to attack intuition, whilst the judiciary defended it.25
However, as Fox & Freiberg claim, the judiciary is now more willing to accept
non-intuitive decision-making.26 Guideline judgments identify a pattern of case
characteristics and indicate the sentence or range of sentences considered
appropriate; there may also be an accompanying non-exhaustive list of poten-
tially aggravating and mitigating factors, which, if present, may justify a sentence
outside the range.27 See Ashworth for example.28 Guideline judgments can be
compared to the “shopping-list” statutes discussed by Christie.29 Stranieri and
others have used knowledge discovery from database techniques to ascertain
the relative weights of shopping-list factors in the domain of property distribu-
tion in Australian family law.30
21. House v. The King (1936), 55 C.L.R. 499, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/ 40.html>
(HCA) [House]. 
22. Austin Lovegrove, “Intuition, Structure and Sentencing: An Evaluation of Guideline Judgments” (2002) 14:2
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 182 at 182.
23. Ibid.
24. George Zdenkowski, “Limiting Sentencing Discretion: Has there been a paradigm shift?” (2000) 12:1
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 58 at 61.
25. Supra note 22 at 183.
26. Richard G. Fox & Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria, 2d ed. (Melbourne,
Australia: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 195-202. 
27. Supra note 22 at 192.
28. Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 3d ed. (London: Butterworths, 2000). 
29. George C. Christie, “An Essay on Discretion” (1986) 35 Duke L.J. 747 at 776ff,
<http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00000029/01/35_Duke_L._J._747_(1986).pdf>. 
30. Andrew Stranieri et al., “A hybrid rule—neural approach for the automation of legal reasoning in the dis-
cretionary domain of family law in Australia” (1999) 7, No. 2-3, A.I. & L. 153 at 156.
6 university of ottawa law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
 
Lovegrove claims that recent judicial attempts to achieve greater con-
sistency have jeopardized adequate individualization and resulted in error. These
limitations arise from three interrelated sources. The first concerns what is
required of a guideline sentence: a sentence as a guideline must be expressed
in terms of a relatively narrow range. The second and third concern the nature of
case circumstances: cases falling in the same legal category or sub-category of
offence vary widely in regard to the facts of the offence and to the characteris-
tics of the offender and, while some factors of aggravation and mitigation in the
scaling of seriousness have a quantitative character, most are qualitative.31 Tata
concurs. He states that the marked judicial ambivalence towards the institution-
alization of aggregate decision-support systems seems at least in large part to
be driven by a concern to be seen to perform a role that balances formal and
substantive visions of justice. A decision-support system is considered most
acceptable when judges regard it as flexible.32
Freiberg states that the desirability of limiting judicial sentencing discre-
tion has dominated sentencing discourse over the last 25 years.33 Zdenkowski
claims that, despite similar influences, the sentencing-reform developments in
North America and Australia have taken different paths.34 He states that for
almost two decades, official sentencing inquiries have examined a rational case
for structuring or guiding sentencing discretion.35 Public confusion and resent-
ment about the gap between sentences announced and sentences served,
apparent disparity in the treatment of similar offences committed by similarly cir-
cumstanced offenders, and the “just-deserts” theory with its emphasis on con-
sistency and fairness were all influential in these inquiries. 
Zdenkowski notes that, apart from the introduction of “truth in sentenc-
ing” and of some other relatively minor recommendations for change,36
Australian jurisdictions did not respond to the perceived concerns with the same
vigour and determination as did their North American counterparts.37 In many
jurisdictions in North America, the reaction to unjustifiable disparity has been to
embrace sentencing guidelines in various forms. However, Zdenkowski points
out that in Australia, for the first time, there have been potentially serious
encroachments on judicial discretion.38 Recent developments include mandatory
31. Supra note 22 at 200.
32. Cyrus Tata, “Resolute ambivalence: Why judiciaries do not institutionalize their decision support systems”
(2000) 14:3 Int’l Rev. L. Comp. & Tech. 297 at 306. 
33. Arie Freiberg, “Sentencing Reform in Victoria: A Case Study” in Chris Clarkson & Rodney Morgan, eds.,
The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 51 at 61.
34. Supra note 24 at 58.
35. Ibid. at 58. See e.g. Austl., Commonwealth, Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No. 44:
Sentencing, ALRC1988 (1998),
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/44/Report_44.txt>; Austl., New South Wales,
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report No. 79: Sentencing, NSWLRC1996a (1996),
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R79TOC>; and Austl., New South Wales, New South Wales
Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 33: Sentencing, NSWLRC1996b (1996),
<http://www.lawlink.nsw. gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/DP33TOC>.
36. See also Ivan Potas et al., “Informing the Discretion: The Sentencing Information System of the Judicial
Commission of New South Wales” (1998) 6:2 Int’l J.L. & I.T. 99.
37. Supra note 24 at 58.
38. Supra note 24 at 60. 
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sentencing laws,39 judicial sentencing guidelines40 and sentencing grids.41
Zdenkowski concludes that the community is likely to embrace the process of
guideline judgments with greater confidence than a politically driven grid system
because guidelines are indicative and flexibility is maintained. He claims that
courts need to explain guideline decisions in an accessible way and that they
need to resist the temptation to conflate consistency and severity.42
1.3. Modelling discretionary decision-making
The development of computer systems that support courts in determining
appropriate sentences is typically motivated by a desire to ensure efficiency and
consistency of decisions. Typically, these systems organize statistical data derived
from databases of prior decisions or retrieve matching cases using algorithms of
varying complexity. Few systems have been developed by explicitly modelling
the reasoning processes that decision-makers use when sentencing offenders. 
The case study reported here involves the development of a prototype
intelligent decision support system based upon a model of judicial reasoning as
it applies to sentencing. The modelling exercise is made difficult in the Victorian
Magistrates (criminal) jurisdiction because magistrates have a degree of discre-
tion within the confines of relatively broadly stated statutory principles. Unlike
other criminal jurisdictions in Australia, when a judge or magistrate in Victoria
considers an appropriate sentence for an offender, there are few guidelines with-
in the statutes43 or the precedent cases. There are a few exceptions, such as the
common law and statutory limitations. In the landmark case in the Supreme
Court of Victoria of R. v. Williscroft, Adam and Crockett JJ. stated: “…ultimately
every sentence imposed represents the sentencing judge’s instinctive synthesis
of all various aspects involved in the punitive process….”44 This was confirmed
by the full Victorian Supreme Court in R. v. Young.45 According to that decision,
39. Mandatory sentencing laws have included Western Australia’s “three-strikes” legislation in 1992 (s. 401(4)
of the Criminal Code (WA)). But see exceptions for young people in s. 189 of the Young Offenders Act
1994; New South Wales’s mandatory life-sentence laws (Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s. 61)
and the Northern Territory’s mandatory-minimum-imprisonment laws for property offenders (introduced
March 1997, repealed under Juvenile Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 2001 for juvenile offenders and the
Sentencing Amendment Act (No. 3) 2001 for adult offenders by the new Labour government).
40. Judicial sentencing guidelines, whereby appellate courts formulate general laws for the purpose of provid-
ing guidance to trial courts, have been in operation in England for over 20 years. The promulgation of such
guidelines is an incremental development from the traditional appellate role of developing common-law
principles with regard to sentencing. The landmark decision of Jurisic (R. v. Jurisic, [1998] NSWSC 597, 45
N.S.W.L.R. 209, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/nsw/supreme%5fct/1998/597.html?
query=jurisic>), a case involving dangerous driving causing death, was the first case in Australia in which a
court issued a formal sentencing guideline judgment. 
41. A sentencing grid or matrix usually involves a two-dimensional graph whose axes reflect “offence serious-
ness” and “prior criminal record.” The penalty level is usually determined by reference to the sentencing
range to be found in the cell of the grid/matrix that corresponds to the offender’s offence and his or her
prior record. Over 20 out of 50 US jurisdictions have embraced sentencing grids. In October 1998, the
Western Australian government introduced legislation authorizing a sentencing matrix system modelled on
that in place in Oregon (the Sentence Administration Bill 1998 (WA) and the Sentencing Legislation
Amendment and Repeal Bill 1998 (WA)).
42. Supra note 24 at 72.
43. Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), supra note 2.
44. [1975] V.R. 292 at p. 300 (Vic SC) [Williscroft]. 
45. [1990] V.R. 951 at p. 955 (Vic SC) [Young].
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the role in determining the just sentence entails an intuitive or “instinctive syn-
thesis” of all the factors before the judge and should not, as the higher courts
and Fox & Freiberg46 state, “…offer any dissection of its components….”
In part because of the difficulties associated with knowledge modelling
in the presence of discretion, Leith has expressed doubt about the potential for
artificial intelligence to “fully represent the richness of legal knowledge in any
useful way.”47 However, the key assumption underpinning this project is that dis-
cretionary reasoning can be usefully modelled—though to do so requires a mod-
elling technique appropriate to the task and a careful analysis of discretion. 
Judicial decision-makers seek to exercise their discretion astutely both
to make the optimum decision in each particular case and also to minimize the
amount of conflict and the likelihood of appeals flowing from their discretion.
Another objective of decision-making is to exhibit a measure of consistency
rather than to appear random.48 Discretion is closely associated with the concept
of “open texture,” a term first used by Waismann to assert that empirical con-
cepts are necessarily indeterminate.49 It is frequently used to describe the ambi-
guity or vagueness in the natural-language descriptions found in legal provisions
or judgments. Law is considered to be open textured in the presence of defea-
sible rules, vague terms or classification ambiguities.50
Discretion is a power or right conferred upon decision-makers to act
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by
the judgment or conscience of others.51 According to Dworkin, discretionary rea-
soning arises when a decision-maker is free to select one from a number of plausi-
ble outcomes.52 As there is no concept of “one correct answer,” it is possible and
sometimes probable for two decision-makers to arrive at different decisions based
on the same facts. This is a result of reliance upon factors described as induction
and intuition as well as the capacity to assess the social impact of decisions. 
Some legal contexts afford decision-makers a greater degree of discre-
tion than others. Legal domains underpinned by so-called “shopping-
list”statutes, providing a list of relevant factors but no guidance as to their relative
importance,53 afford the decision-maker a high degree of discretion. Christie54
specifically identifies such factors as domains of law requiring the decision-maker
to exercise a kind of “Dworkinian” weak discretion, observing that the exercise of
46. Supra note 26 at 195.
47. Philip Leith, “The Judge and the Computer: How Best ‘Decision Support?’” (1998) 6:(2-4) A.I. & L. 289 at
289.
48. Uri Schild, Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, “Techniques for Reasoning in Discretionary Legal
Domains” in M. Hamza, ed., Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Law and Technology,
LawTech 1999 (California: ACTA Press, 1999) 51 at 59–61.
49. Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability: Logic and Language (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1951).
50. Henry Prakken, Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument: A Study in Defeasible Reasoning in Law
(Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Press, 1997).
51. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. “discretion”.
52. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 2d ed. (London: Duckworth, 1997) at 31–39, 68–71, 159–161.
53. Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, “A re-examination of the concepts of open texture and stare decisis
for data mining in discretionary domains” in Proceedings of Eleventh International Conference on Legal
Knowledge Based Systems 1999 (Groningen, Netherlands: Kroniklijke Vermand, 1999) 101 at 104. 
54. George C. Christie, “An Essay on Discretion” (1986) Duke L.J. 747 at 767ff.
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the discretion inevitably involves power relationships within a political system.55
Zeleznikow groups the degree of discretion in legal domains into four
categories. These categories are useful in identifying the types of approaches
that are appropriate for modelling reasoning in a domain:56
• No discretion. In these domains there is no room for interpretation.
Jurisdictions with mandatory sentencing exemplify this group. Tightly
defined sentencing guidelines can be modelled as a set of IF-THEN
rules.57
• Narrow discretion. These domains have clear norms expressed in legis-
lation, cases or legal opinions. However, judges may deviate from these
norms and exercise some minimum discretion. These domains can usu-
ally be modelled using case-based reasoning.58
• Bounded discretion. Although these domains do not have explicit
norms, the factors that judges must take into account are specified in
legislation or cases. “Shopping-list” statutes typify this group.
Considerable judicial discretion is involved and modelling with IF-THEN
rules is difficult. “Knowledge Discovery from Databases” techniques can
be gainfully used to model such domains.59 An example of such a
domain is the distribution of marital property following divorce in
Australia.60
• Unfettered discretion. These domains also have no norms and the fac-
tors that the judges should base their decisions upon are also not spec-
ified. They are unsuitable for knowledge modelling. Examples of such
domains include the granting of refugee status and the welfare of chil-
dren in Australian Family Law.61
Much of the remainder of this paper discusses “models.” But what is a
model in the context of this paper? A model is not reality. It is never a depiction
of the whole domain but, rather, is a subset selected to be useful for a particular
purpose. Stranieri and others demonstrate that the operationalization of the con-
55. In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin presents a systematic account of discretion by proposing two
basic types of discretion, which he called “strong” and “weak” discretion. Weak discretion is used to char-
acterize situations where a decision-maker must interpret standards in his own way, whereas strong discre-
tion characterizes those decisions where the decision-maker is not bound by any standards and is required
to create his or her own standards. See supra note 52 at 31–34. 
56. John Zeleznikow, “Building Decision Support Systems in Discretionary Legal Domains” (2000) Int’l Rev. L.
Comp. & Tech. 341 at 344.
57. A crisp rule is of the form IF <condition(s)>, THEN <action>. An example of such a rule is if you drink and
drive then you lose your licence. In Victoria, it is prohibited to drive with a blood-alcohol-level greater than
.05%. Rules to indicate this are: drink(X) & drive (X) ‡ licence_loss(x), (blood_alcohol_level (X) > .05%) ‡
drink (X). 
58. Case-based reasoning is the process of using previous experience to analyze or solve a new problem, of
explaining why previous experiences are or are not similar to the present problem and of adapting past
solutions to meet the requirements of the present problem.
59. Knowledge discovery is the non-trivial extraction of implicit, previously unknown and potentially useful
information from data. See Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, Knowledge Discovery from Legal
Databases, vol. 69, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2004) for a detailed discussion of how knowledge
discovery from databases can be used to model discretionary reasoning in bounded domains.
60. John Zeleznikow, “The Split-up Project: Induction, Context and Knowledge Discovery in Law” (2004) 3 Law,
Probability and Risk 147 at 157.
61. Supra note 56 at 344.
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cept of discretion is linked to the knowledge-representation method used to
model reasoning.62 If reasoning is modelled using rules, then discretion manifests
itself as alternate sets of rules, each of which can be legitimately applied to a
case leading to different outcomes. A rule-conflict strategy is required in order
to automate discretionary legal reasoning using rules. This is feasible in fields of
law characterized as “narrow discretion,” but becomes unfeasible in “bounded-
discretion” fields because the number of possible rules in each alternate set is
too large to model or automate effectively. 
The modelling framework adopted for this study integrates two struc-
tures: decision trees63 and argument trees.64 Discretion is operationalized as both
the selection of alternate ways to combine existing factors and the option to
include or ignore new factors and is therefore appropriate for modelling reason-
ing in “bounded-discretion” fields such as sentencing. Figure 1 illustrates a deci-
sion tree. Nodes represent decision points and the possible outcomes of each
decision are captured in arcs emerging from the node and ending in leaf nodes.
62. Andrew Stranieri, John Yearwood & Tunde Meikle, “The Dependency of Discretion and Consistency of
Knowledge Representation” (2000) 14:3 Int’l Rev. L. Comp. & Tech. 325.
63. A decision tree is an explicit representation of all scenarios that can result from a given decision. The root
of the tree represents the initial situation, whilst each path emanating from the root corresponds to one
possible scenario. See for further details John Zeleznikow & Dan Hunter, Building Intelligent Legal
Information Systems: Knowledge Representation and Reasoning in Law, Vol. 13 (Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1994) at 260–261, 266, 268, 299.
64. Stephen Toulmin in The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958) concluded that
most arguments, regardless of the domain, have a structure that consists of six basic invariants: claim, data,
modality, rebuttal, warrant and backing. Every argument makes a claim based on some data. Stranieri et
al., supra note 62, developed a template for knowledge representation that varies the Toulmin structure.
The template differs from the Toulmin structure in that it includes: (1) a variable-value representation of
claim and data items; (2) a certainty variable associated with each variable-value rather than a modality or
force associated with the entire argument; (3) reasons for the relevance of the data items in place of the
warrant; (4) a list of inference procedures that can be used to infer a claim value from data values in place
of the warrant; (5) reasons for the appropriateness of each inference procedure; (6) context variables; (7)
the absence of the rebuttal component present in the original formulation; (8) the inclusion of a claim value
reason component. Zeleznikow and Stranieri discuss the concepts of decision trees and argument trees in
two related articles: See Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, “WebShell: The development of web based
expert systems”in Research and Development in Expert Systems XVIII. Proceedings of ES2001—The 21st
SGES International Conference on Knowledge based Systems and Applied Artificial Intelligence (London:
Springer Verlag, 2002) 245; John Zeleznikow & Andrew Stranieri, “A framework for the construction of
legal decision support systems,” Business Information Systems BIS 2002 (Poznan, Poland: ACM, 2002).
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Figure 1. Rule-based procedural knowledge model
Decision one in figure 1 has two possible outcomes: “no,” leading to a conclusion
(outcome one), and “yes,” leading to a second decision. Decision two in figure 1
has three possible outcomes: “good,” “bad” and “just acceptable” with no explic-
it rules for deciding between them. The shadow indicates that further information
about this decision is available in a second diagrammatic model. Such decisions
with discretionary elements are modelled using an argumentation technique.
Figure 2. Argument tree
Factor One
Factor Two Decision Two
Factor Three
Factor 
Twenty-one
• false 
• true
• false 
• true
• oranges
• lemons
• never
• sometimes
• always
• bad
• just acceptable
• good
• no 
• yes
Factor 
Twenty-two
Decision One Outcome One
Decision Two Outcome Two
Outcome Three
no
yes
bad
good
just acceptable
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Argument trees derive from a model of structured reasoning called the Generic
Actual Argument Model advanced by Stranieri and others.65 The trees are hier-
archies of relevant factors. In this study the root node or culminating factor is a
decision-tree node. When discretion is present, argument trees are used to fur-
ther refine the knowledge depicted as directed graph nodes; for example,
“Decision Two” in figure 1 is further elaborated in figure 2. 
Figure 2 illustrates an argument tree with nodes representing factors
that are relevant for inferring nodes higher in the tree. For example, figure 2
shows that “Factor One,” “Factor Two” and “Factor Three” are all relevant for
inferring “Decision Two.” However, how these three factors combine is left
unspecified. Further, the value of “Factor Two” is inferred in some discretionary
way from the values of “Factor Twenty-one” and “Factor Twenty-two.” The val-
ues of “Factor One,” “Factor Two” and “Factor Three” are used to infer whether
the “Decision Two” outcome is “bad,” “good” or “just acceptable.” This in turn
is fed back to the decision tree depicted in figure 1.
The Argument Tree provides a diagrammatic representation of the struc-
ture of reasoning. The tree can be elicited from experts in a “bounded-discre-
tion” field of law. Once the structure is explicated a variety of methods can be
used to model the way in which factors are combined to infer values at the next
level. Stranieri and his colleagues trained neural networks, a machine learning
technique from artificial intelligence from past cases in family law.66 In modelling
refugee law, Yearwood & Stranieri have found that at some levels of the argu-
ment tree for determining refugee law, the way in which decision-makers com-
bine factors ought not be modelled at all because the domain varies vastly from
case to case.67
The Decision Tree and Argument based structure discussed above was
used to propose an advisory system on computer copyright.68 “ADVOKATE”69 is
a web-enabled, knowledge-based decision support application designed for use
in criminal investigations, in civil litigation or as a teaching aide for investigative
training. ADVOKATE provides an indicative assessment of the credibility of eye-
witness testimony. It uses 23 arguments and uses the Decision Tree and
Argument based structure discussed in Stranieri and others.70
65. Andrew Stranieri, John Zeleznikow & John Yearwood, “Argumentation Structures that Integrate Dialectical
and Monoletical Reasoning” (2001) 16:4 Knowledge Engineering Rev. 331.
66. John Zeleznikow, Andrew Stranieri & Mark Gawler, “Split-Up: A legal expert system which determines
property division on divorce” (1996) 3 A.I. & L. 267; Stranieri et al., supra note 30 at 153.
67. John Yearwood & Andrew Stranieri, “The integration of retrieval, reasoning and drafting for refugee law: a
third generation legal knowledge based system” in Proceedings of Seventh International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence and Law (Oslo: ACM, 1999) 117 at 119.
68. Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, “Copyright Regulation with Argumentation Agents” (2001) 10:1 I. &
Comm. T. L. 109. 
69. Michael C. Bromby & Maria Jean Hall, “The Development and Rapid Evaluation of the Knowledge Model
of ADVOKATE: an Advisory System to Assess the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony” in Proceedings of
Fifteenth International Conference on Legal Knowledge Based Systems 2002 (Amsterdam: IOS
Publications, 2002), <http://www.cfslr.ed.ac.uk/publications/p16.pdf>.
70. Stranieri et al., supra note 65.
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1.4. Sentencing decision-support systems
Zeleznikow states that when considering decision-making as a knowledge-man-
ufacturing process, the purpose of a decision-support system is to help the user
manage knowledge.71 A decision-support system fulfils this purpose by enhanc-
ing the user’s competence in representing and processing knowledge. It supple-
ments human knowledge-management skills with computer-based means for
managing knowledge. A decision-support system accepts, stores, uses, receives
and presents knowledge pertinent to the decisions being made. Its capabilities
are defined by the types of knowledge with which it can work, the ways in which
it can represent these various types of knowledge and its capabilities for pro-
cessing these representations. 
Lovegrove analyzes what he calls an “offender-offence-Sentencing
Information System,” a computer system which retrieves statistical data based on
such factors as the personality of the offender, the category of the crime and
whether a weapon was used.72 As Schild points out, existing Sentencing
Information Systems use only a small number of factors, out of which the sen-
tencer is supposed to choose an even smaller number.73 Otherwise, the database
becomes too large.
Lovegrove sees seven major problems in trying to use statistical informa-
tion systems (SIS) as a means to achieve consistency and rationality in sentencing:74
• Classification. Which factors should the SIS present to the user? 
• Selection. Which factors should the sentencer use? 
• Ranking. How should factors be ranked in general and for a specific
case? 
• Awareness. A sentencer may not be aware of all possible factors relevant
to a given case, especially if she is inexperienced. 
•. Discretionary Width. The greater the number of extra factors and the
greater the width of the distribution of sentences, the greater the likeli-
hood of large variations.
• Scaling. Factors should be measured in scales, the lengths of which
should be provided by the system. 
• Inconsistent Database. How can an inconsistent database help judges to
reach decisions? 
• Intercorrelations. Factors in the database are often intercorrelated, a
feature that may unwittingly be reflected in the sentencer’s use of the
database. 
• Multiple Offences. How should statistics relating to multiple offences be
presented? Typically, sentencing systems are statistically based, retriev-
ing information from databases of past cases. A few systems attempt to
71. John Zeleznikow, “Using Web-based Legal Decision Support Systems to Improve Access to Justice” (2002)
11:1. & Comm. T. L. 15 at 17. 
72. Austin Lovegrove, “Statistical information systems as a means to consistency and rationality in sentencing”
(1999) 7:1 Int’l J. L. & I.T. 31 at 32.
73. Uri J. Schild, “Statistical Information Systems for Sentencing: The Israeli Approach” (2000) 14:3 Int’l Rev. L.
Comp. & Tech. 317 at 320.
74. Supra note 72 at 45–51.
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predict judicial decisions using rule-based or case-based techniques. 
Examples of automated systems that support courts in the application
of sentencing include: 
• “ASSYST.”75 ASSYST is a sentencing-guideline calculator based on the
United States Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.76 It uses a heuristic
approach to combine offence seriousness with previous conviction his-
tory to produce a guideline sentence.
• “Judge’s Apprentice.”77 The Judge’s Apprentice is a Knowledge Based
System78 that provides support for the sentencing of Israelis convicted
of rape or robbery. “Domain experts”79 are used to discover relevant
factors. The existence of base sentences is assumed. Setting out from
the base sentence, the system weighs aggravating factors (which
increase the sentence) and mitigating factors (which decrease the sen-
tence).
• “LIST.”80 LIST provides to judges statistical information retrieved from a
database of criminal cases in British Columbia, Canada. A similar system
has been built in New South Wales, Australia.81
• “NSW SIS.”82 The New South Wales Sentencing Information System
contains a Court of Criminal Appeal judgments component containing
over 3000 full-text judgments. It includes a “sentencing-principles”
database, a sentencing-statistics component and a sentencing-date cal-
culator.83
• “NOSTRA”84 is a Sentencing Information System used in the criminal
courts of the four northern provinces of the Netherlands. Tata claims
that the initiative shown by judges is attributed, at least in part, to judi-
cial concerns that, if judges themselves do not make efforts to encour-
age consistency in sentencing, then the powerful office of the Public
Prosecutor will try to commit them to its own sentencing guidelines.85
• “IVS.”86 IVS is an advanced retrieval system that supports judges in find-
75. Eric Simon & Gerry Gaes, “ASSYST—Computer Support for Guideline Sentencing” in Proceedings of the
Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law 1989 (New York: ACM Press, 1989).
76. United States Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 991ff (1984).
77. Uri J. Schild, “Decisions Support for Criminal Sentencing” (1998) 6:4 A.I. & L. 151.
78. A knowledge-based system is a computer program in which domain knowledge is explicit and is contained
separately from the system’s other knowledge.
79. A domain expert is a person who is involved in the construction of an expert system, who has specific
expertise in that domain and who advises the knowledge engineer of the knowledge which is to be placed
in the expert system.
80. J. Hogarth, Computers and the Law: Sentencing Database System User’s Guide (Vancouver: LIST
Corporation, 1988).
81. Janet Chan, “A Computerized Sentencing Information System for New South Wales Courts” (1991)
Computer Law and Practice 137.
82. Ibid.
83. The sentencing-date calculator is used to calculate the exact date for the commencement and ending of
minimum and additional custodial terms.
84. M. Otte, “NOSTRA, een informatiesysteem voor de straftoemeting, in De computer als weegschaal van de
rechter” (1998) 5 Justitele Verkenningen WODC, Den Haag/Arnhem, Gouda Quint 62.
85. Supra note 32 at 300. 
86. Eduard W. Oskamp, Computerondersteuning bij straftoemeting, de ontwikkeling van een databank
(Netherlands: Leiden University, 1998).
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ing relevant precedents in five different domains, including traffic and
drug offences. 
• “Scottish SIS.”87 The Scottish Sentencing Information System contains
mainly numerical information with over 6000 first-instance cases and all
decisions of the Appeal Court (since 1993) concerning sentences. 
Early work on predicting judicial decisions typically involved statistical
techniques like, for example, the nearest-neighbour rule88 and visual representa-
tion of case patterns.89 Few legal-reasoning systems have been developed in dis-
cretionary domains, two exceptions being the application of rule-based
reasoning techniques for the use of Israeli probation officers who needed to rec-
ommend sentences for young criminals90 and an application in the discretionary
domain of Family Law in Scotland.91 Edwards and others reported some inade-
quacies of that approach and a decade later revisited the problem of the distri-
bution of marital assets on divorce using techniques similar to those described in
this paper.92
Some developers have gone beyond a simple application of rules.
HaCohen-Kerner & Schild built a case-based system, the Judge’s Apprentice, to
provide support for the sentencing of Israeli criminals found guilty of rape or rob-
bery.93 In his book on the future of law, which was published in 1996, Richard
Susskind discusses Information Technology support for the judicial process, con-
cluding that “it is not fanciful to suppose that future automation will include sen-
tencing databases.”94 The objective of the study described in the remainder of
this paper was to explore the possibilities and the challenges of modelling and
providing automated support for judicial reasoning. 
*
2. THE VICTORIAN MAGISTRATES’ SENTENCING PROJECT 
THIS SECTION PRESENTS the knowledge models developed in the Victorian sen-
tencing project. The project was conducted in two phases, a modelling phase
and a program-development phase. 
87. Neil Hutton et al., “Decision Support for Sentencing in a Common Law Jurisdiction” in Proceedings of
Fifth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (College Park, Maryland: ACM, 1995) 89. 
88. The nearest-neighbour algorithm is used in information retrieval where data that is closest to the search is
retrieved. To perform this search, we need a “metric” (distance function) between the occurrence of each
piece of data.
89. E. McKaay & Pierre-N. Robillard, “Predicting judicial decisions: the nearest neighbour rule and visual repre-
sentation of case patterns” (1974) Datenverarbeitung im Recht 302.
90. M. Shapira, “Computerized Decision Technology in Social Service” (1990) 10 International Journal of
Sociology and Social Policy 138.
91. Lilian Edwards & John A.K. Huntley, “Creating a Civil Jurisdiction Adviser” (1992) 1:1 Law, Computers and
Artificial Intelligence 5 at 21. 
92. J. Kingston, Lilian Edwards & Maria Jean J. Hall, “Prototyping a Legal Decision Support System: A Case
Study” in Proceedings of the ISLAT Third International Conference on Law and Technology 2002 (Anaheim:
ACTA Press, 2002) 200.
93. Yaakov HaCohen-Kerner & Uri J. Schild, “The Judge’s Apprentice” (1999) 5 The New Review of Applied
Expert Systems 191.
94. Richard E. Susskind, The Future of Law: Facing the Challenges of Information Technology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996) at 202.
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2.1. Modelling reasoning in sentencing in the Victorian Magistrates’ Court
Susskind makes the distinction between academic and experiential legal knowl-
edge. Academic legal knowledge can be gleaned from the primary and second-
ary sources of law by research into statutes, legal texts, commentaries and
judicial precedent. Experiential legal knowledge comes from personal experi-
ence acquired through day-to-day work with the law.95 A knowledge engineer
may elicit experiential knowledge from an expert or, alternatively, extract readi-
ly accessible law statements (academic knowledge) from statutes, treatises, judi-
cial precedents and textbooks amongst other sources. For this project, legal
knowledge was acquired from two major sources; the relevant statute was
reviewed and a first draft of the knowledge model prepared. This model was
subsequently reviewed by legal experts from Victoria Legal Aid and iteratively
refined as a result of the feedback received. 
The principal statute, the Sentencing Act 1991 of Victoria, Australia,96
has several stated purposes, the first of which is the promotion of a consistent
approach to the sentencing of offenders. The Act lays out governing principles
to guide the sentencing decision-maker but, in essence, the judge determines
the sentence to be imposed. The judicial officer is granted wide discretionary
powers to interpret and weigh the facts of the case and any other relevant fac-
tors as he sees fit in cognizance of the governing principles.
In the first phase of modelling, the knowledge engineers held discus-
sions with a panel of domain experts regarding the nature of sentencing in the
Magistrates’ Court. The domain experts are listed in the acknowledgments sec-
tion of this paper. They all are affiliated with Victoria Legal Aid97 and have exten-
sive knowledge of and practice in sentencing in the Victorian Magistrates’ Court.
After reading the relevant statutes, the knowledge engineers and domain
experts developed the decision and argument trees as described in section 1.2
above. A system was then constructed. A future task will be the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the system.
The remainder of this section presents the models developed in this
phase. The top-level flow of reasoning in sentencing is depicted using a decision
tree, part of which is illustrated in figure 3 and is continued in figure 4. The
remaining models are argumentation trees and depict the discretionary elements
of the sentencing decision. Figure 5 shows a top view of the factors involved in
the discretionary decision and figures 6 to 8 provide a more detailed analysis.
95. Richard E. Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Inquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987) at 56.
96. Supra note 2.
97. Victoria Legal Aid, based in Victoria, Australia, is a government-funded provider of legal services for disad-
vantaged clients. Its goals include providing legal aid in the most effective, economic and efficient manner
and pursuing innovative means of providing legal services in the community,
<http://www.legalaid.vic.gov.au>.
Supporting Discretionary Decision Making 17[2005] 2 UOLTJ 1
 
Figure 3. Part of sentencing procedural decision tree98
Offender
found guilty
Offender
discharged
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Offender
17–25?
no
Defer
sentence without
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s.83A
Restitution 
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Sentencing
deferred
yes
yes
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no
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within 6 months
START
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98. Sections refer to the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic.), supra note 2.
Figure 4. Sentencing model—part of the procedural decision tree99
Figure 4 shows part of the procedural decision tree. “Impose sentence” is a dis-
cretionary decision and the factors that influence this decision are shown in more
detail in figures 5 to 8.
Impose
sentence
partial 
imprisonment
with conviction
active
immediate
imprisonment
with conviction
Offender
Discharged
Community
based order s. 36
Intensive 
correction order 
ss. 19–26
Youth 
residential
service order
Youth training
centre order
Fine
Adjourned 
undertaking
offender
discharged
Age of 
offender
Age 21
or above
10–14
15–20
unconditional dismissal without conviction s. 76
unconditional discharge with conviction s. 73
adjourned for up to 5 years with or without conviction ss. 72,75
fine with or without conviction ss. 49–59, 109(2) and 109(3)(a)
CBO with or without conviction Part 3/Div 3
intensive correction order with conviction
a
99. Sections refer to the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic.), ibid.
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Figure 5. Top-level sentencing argumentation model with expansion of first node
Figure 5 depicts two argumentation models and should be read from right to
left. As has been discussed above in section 1.3, argumentation models are one
means of demonstrating the contributing factors to a discretionary decision. The
right-hand model shows the top-level argumentation model for the main node
“impose sentence” (refer to figure 4 where this decision forms part of the pro-
cedural decision tree). The right-hand model of figure 5 shows the sentencing
outcomes of the “impose-sentence” decision and the seven main factors con-
tributing to this discretionary decision. Each of the seven factors can vary in its
significance. The possible data values for the first factor—“serving the purposes
of sentencing”—are shown fully expanded. The left-hand model of figure 5
shows the node “serving the purposes of sentencing” further expanded, includ-
ing data values for its first node. The potential outcomes of the left-hand model
in turn become the input-data values to the right-hand model. 
Figures 6 to 8 provide further detail of the main contributing factors
shown in the right-hand model of figure 4. These figures provide expanded ver-
sions of the nodes “impact of the offence,” “the offender” and “the offence.”
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Figure 6. Argumentation sentencing model: Impact of the offence
Figure 6 shows an expanded version of the figure 5 node “impact of the
offence.” In the interests of keeping the diagrams readable, possible data values
are only included for some of the nodes, as, for example, “impact of the offence
upon the community.” The impact of the offence is considered from three per-
spectives: the impact on the victim, the impact on the victim’s family and close
associates, and the impact on the community at large. There are many potentially
relevant factors that could be considered when determining the impact of the
offence upon the victim, including property loss and personal circumstances.
Some of these are shown in a partially expanded form in this diagram. There is
significant potential for this section of the model to be further expanded.
Figure 7 shows a partially expanded model of the figure 5 “offender”
node. This model expands relevant factors about the offender from a time per-
spective relevant to commission of the crime—i.e. before, during and after the
crime was committed. Other factors concerning the offender, shown unexpand-
ed here, are concerned with the following: the offender’s personal circum-
stances; any likely impact on the offender of recording a conviction or sending
him or her to jail; and the offender’s suitability for available courses, treatment
and other programs that might assist in the offender’s rehabilitation.
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Figure 7. Sentencing argumentation model: The offender
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Figure 8. Sentencing argumentation model: The offence
Within the 
family relationship
• none 
• insignificant
• significant 
• very significant
• none 
• trifling
• not so serious 
• serious
• very serious
• none 
• insignificant
• significant 
• very significant
• extreme
• uncaring
• tolerance
• abhorrence 
• extreme 
 repugnance
Within a relationship
with another authority
• none 
• insignificant
• significant 
• very significant
Whether offence is of
trivial, technical, minor
nature
Breach of trust
occurrence
• no 
• yes
• low 
• average
• high
The extent to which
the law was breached
• none 
• minor
• significant 
• major
Degree of violence
• none 
• minor
• significant 
• major
Current community 
attitude to this type
of offence 
• uncommon
• common
• very common 
Prevalence of
offence/reported
crime rate
• assault
• armed robbery
 etc 
Type of offence
• not serious 
• average
• serious
Gravity of offence
compared to
other offences
of this type
Impact of the 
offence on
the sentence
• low
• medium
• high
Degree of
planning of
offence
Degree of 
premeditation
• none 
• minor
• significant 
• major
Duration of
offence
• instantaneous
• minutes
• hours
• days  etc.
Vulnerability of 
the victim
• low 
• average
• high
Amount of 
organization in 
planning and 
perpetrating the
offence
• low 
• average
• high
Sophistication of 
the planning and 
perpetration of the
offence
Supporting Discretionary Decision Making 23[2005] 2 UOLTJ 1
 
Figure 8 expands figure 5’s “offence” node. Here, the major contributing factors
include the gravity of the offence, the amount of planning involved in the com-
mission of the offence and any significant breach of trust that occurred during
the execution of the crime. Also considered is the prevalence of this type of
crime and community attitudes to the commission of such crimes.
The sentencing knowledge models, some of which are depicted in fig-
ures 3 to 8 above, are the result of an iterative refinement process involving
knowledge engineers and legal experts. The models were evaluated through a
review process involving legal-sentencing experts who had not provided legal
expertise during the development of the model.
2.2. A Web-based implementation of the sentencing system
When the experts were satisfied that the knowledge model was complete and
correct, it was implemented as a web-based application using the expert-system-
shell “justReason.”100 This is a shell program available for open-source download
and specifically designed to encode knowledge as decision-and-argument trees
for the rapid generation of web programs. The open-source version of the shell
has a built-in weighted-sum mechanism for implementing argument-tree infer-
ences. “JUSTSYS” is an Australian start-up company that develops legal-knowl-
edge-based systems for the internet. Its rationale for developing such tools came
from the extended use of Toulmin Argument Structures for represented legal
knowledge.101
JUSTSYS has recently launched “GetAid”102—a web-based decision-
support system for determining eligibility for legal aid, which consists of eight
arguments. Clients of Victoria Legal Aid103 use the GetAid system to determine
their eligibility for Legal Aid. After passing a financial test, applicants for legal aid
must pass a merit test. This assessment involves the integration of procedural
knowledge found in regulatory guidelines with expert-lawyer knowledge that
involves a considerable degree of discretion. Knowledge Discovery from
Databases (KDD) was used to model the discretionary task. GetAid was devel-
oped in conjunction with web-based lodgement of applications for legal aid and
has recently gone online.
Figure 9 below illustrates a screen dump from the sentencing program
as seen through a web browser such as Internet Explorer. The prompt is gener-
ated directly from the first node in figure 4. The presence of an argument tree
underneath the “impose-sentence” node is depicted in the web page as a “Not
Sure” button. On selecting “Not Sure,” the user is presented with a list of
prompts that derive from figure 5 and that drill down under their own control,
with other “Not Sure” buttons, to prompts generated from figures 6, 7 or 8.
100. Please see <http://www.justsys.com.au>.
101. Supra note 64.
102. Maria Hall, Andrew Stranieri & John Zeleznikow, “A Strategy for Evaluating Web-Based Discretionary Decision
Support Systems” in Yannis Manolopoulos & Pavol Navrat, eds., Advances in Databases and Information
Systems: 6th East-European Conference, ADBIS 2002, Bratislava, Slovakia, September 8-11, 2002.
Proceedings, vol. 2 (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2002) 108, <http://www.dcs.elf.stuba.sk/adbis2002/>. 
103. Supra note 97.
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Figure 9. Sample justReason internet-deployed prototype
Figure 10 below illustrates a screen that the knowledge engineer in conjunction
with domain experts used to set weights for the weighted-sum formulas that the
open-source version of justReason uses to model the way in which sentencing
decision-makers combine factors. “Addiction” is used as an example to demon-
strate this process.
The extent to which “addiction” is a mitigating factor in an offence—first
illustrated in the node labeled “addiction” in figure 7 above and portrayed in
more detail on figure 10—is inferred from three factors: the extent of any addic-
tion to drugs, the extent of addiction to gambling and the degree to which the
addiction was a contributing factor. 
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Figure 10. The impact of addiction on the culpability of the offender
In the current study, a knowledge engineer, in conjunction with a sentencing
domain expert set weights. These weights were used by the inference mechanism
of the web-based tool illustrated in figure 11. The weights are entered in the top
half of figure 11 and the result of specific inferences is illustrated in the lower half.
The domain expert and knowledge engineer first assign a weight (or ranking) to
each value of the three factors. For example, the domain expert and knowledge
engineer assigned a value of “30” where the dependency contributes to a very
significant degree to the offence, “10” where the dependency contributes signif-
icantly, “2” where the dependency is insignificant and “1” where the dependen-
cy is not applicable. A weight of 10 is assigned to cases that involve drug
dependency and the same weight is applied to cases involving gambling. An
offender who committed burglary as a result of a drug addition receives a score
of 10 on the drug-dependency factor, a score of 1 on the gambling factor and a
score of 30 on the extent of contribution factor making a total of 40.
Once weights have been assigned to variables, the knowledge engineer
and domain expert assign a threshold to values of the inferred variable in order
to classify the total into one of the values. The threshold assigned to represent
cases where the claim that “addiction mitigates against the offender’s culpabili-
ty” was “20.” Thus, any total that exceeds 20 will result in the inference that the
addiction mitigates against culpability. Any total between 2 and 20 results in the
inference that the addiction does not mitigate against culpability. 
The weighted-sum mechanism is very flexible and, by and large, experts
can assign weights and a threshold for the system to quite easily infer accurate
claims. However, a mechanism is included for domain experts to be able to
declare an exception to the weighted-sum formula. Whilst the weights and
thresholds set by the knowledge engineer and domain expert are accurate for
most cases, they can, on a small proportion of possible cases, result in inferences
deemed incorrect by the domain expert. If attempts at changing the weights do
not resolve this problem, the weights can be retained and a specific exception
entered in a look-up table. In these cases, the inference engine uses the look-up
table inference rather than the value calculated by the weighted-sum formula. 
Offender's addiction
to gambling
• has no 
• has an
• is not 
• is
• played no part in
• does not mitigate
 against
• mitigates against
Offender Drug/
Alcohol dependent
Dependency's
contribution to
commission of
the offence 
• not applicable
• not at all
• insignificant
• significant
• very significant
Addiction's
impact on
culpability of
the offender
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Figure 11. Web-based tool to capture inferring weights from experts
The implementation of an inference with the use of a weighted-sum formula is
readily understood by experts and has resulted in the articulation of accurate
inferences by experts in a range of knowledge-based systems. Currently, weights
and thresholds cannot be derived from databases of past sentencing decisions
because the data required is typically stored in narrative form in a judgment and
rarely appears in structured form in a database. 
However, in the past we have conducted projects that ascertain the
weights of relevant factors in a domain that had “shopping-list” statutes. “Split
Up”104 is a hybrid-rule-based/neural-network system105 that uses textbooks,
heuristics, expert advice and cases to model that part of the Australian Family
Law Act 1975106 dealing with property division. The Act directs a decision-maker
to take into account the past contributions of each party to a failed marriage in
addition to their resources for coping with life into the future. Rather than offer-
ing one definition for “contributions” and one for “needs,” the statute presents
104. Stranieri et al., supra note 30 at 153.
105. A neural network receives its name from the fact that it resembles a nervous system in the brain. It consists
of many self-adjusting processing elements cooperating in a densely interconnected network. Each pro-
cessing element generates a single output signal, which is transmitted to the other processing elements.
The output signal of a processing element depends on the inputs to the processing element: each input is
gated by a weighting factor that determines the amount of influence that the input will have on the output.
The strength of the weighting factors is adjusted autonomously by the processing element as data is
processed. Neural networks are particularly useful in law because they can deal with (a) classification diffi-
culties, (b) vague terms, (c) defeasible rules and (d) discretionary domains.
106. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.), <http://scaletext.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/229/top.htm>.
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a “shopping list” of factors to be taken into account in arriving at a property
order. For example, the age, state of health and financial resources of each part-
ner are explicitly mentioned in the statute as relevant factors and, yet, their rela-
tive levels of importance are left unspecified.
Although the statute presents a flat list of relevant factors without spec-
ifying how these factors relate to each other, we realized that the factors could
be placed in a hierarchy. The development of the hierarchy required specific
knowledge supplied by domain experts. A sophisticated hierarchy of 94 factors
presented in figure 12 was elicited. Figure 12 demonstrates that the factors rel-
evant for a percentage split determination (extreme right of figure) are past con-
tributions of a husband relative to those of the wife, the husband’s future needs
relative to those of the wife and the wealth of the marriage. The factors relevant
for a determination of past contributions are the relative direct and indirect con-
tributions of both parties, the length of the marriage and the relative contribu-
tions of both parties to the homemaking role. No attempt is made in figure 12
to represent the way in which relevant factors are combined to infer factors high-
er in the hierarchy. The hierarchy of figure 12 provides a structure that was used
to break down the task of predicting an outcome into 35 sub-tasks. Outputs of
sub-tasks further down the hierarchy are used as inputs into sub-tasks higher in
the hierarchy. Solid arcs in figure 12 represent inferences drawn with the use of
rule sets whereas dashed arcs depict inferences performed using neural net-
works (or indeed any other KDD technique). It should be noted that the hierar-
chy modelled in figure 12 does not coincide with the models that we described
in section 1.3. The hierarchy in figure 12 was developed in 1994 and 1995, eight
years before the sentencing models were developed.
28 university of ottawa law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
 
Figure 12. Hierarchy of relevant factors for percentage split determination
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Fayyad and others claim that the KDD process involves five stages: data
selection, data pre-processing, data transformation, data mining107 and evalua-
tion.108 The Split Up database consists of 103 commonplace cases109 recorded in
free text. To use these commonplace cases, we had to transform them into a pre-
designed template that consisted of 94 factors. 
Zeleznikow, Sourdin and Stranieri, in conjunction with JUSTSYS and
Victoria Legal Aid, have received an Australian Research Council Linkage grant,
with title Knowledge Discovery in Discretionary Legal Domains. One goal of this
project will be to learn the relative weights of factors used in sentencing deci-
sion-making.
*
3. THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF BUILDING 
A SENTENCING DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
SCHILD AND OTHERS NOTE that the development of decision support systems
that model the exercise of legal discretion has important ramifications for the
way in which justice is administered.110 The following section highlights some of
these expected benefits and discusses some of the concomitant risks and disad-
vantages that require acknowledgement and subsequent careful management. 
3.1. How sentencing decision support systems benefit the legal community
Frase has noted that the consensus in North America in support of a substantial
reduction in judicial discretion via sentencing guidelines emerged as a result of
the convergence of a disparate coalition of interests.111 Conservatives were con-
cerned about undue influence whilst liberals contended that wide discretion pro-
duced unjust disparities. 
Zdenkowski claims that Australian attempts to constrain judicial discre-
tion in sentencing decision-making derive from law-and-order populism and a
perception that sentence severity should be increased. He notes that, as with any
mandatory measure, criticism has been directed at its inflexibility and conse-
quent potential for capricious and Draconian operation, for the shifting of dis-
cretion to prosecutors (with the resulting lack of opportunity for review), and for
fewer guilty pleas and resulting cost and delay.112 In Australia, mandatory sen-
107. Data mining is a problem-solving methodology that finds a logical or mathematical description, eventually
of a complex nature, of patterns and regularities in a set of data.
108. Usuma M. Fayyad, Gregory Piatetsky-Shapiro & Padraig Smyth, “The KDD Process for Extracting Useful
Knowledge from Volumes of Data” (1996) 39:1 Communications of the ACM 27 at 29.
109. A commonplace case is one that does not provide any lessons by itself, but together with numerous like
cases can be used to derive conclusions. The Split Up project used commonplace cases to learn the 
relative weights of factors. Landmark cases would not be appropriate, as they would introduce new factors
that had not previously been considered in judicial decision-making.
110. Supra note 48 at 61.
111. Richard S. Frase, “Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota and Other American States: A Progress Report” in
Chris Clarkson & Rodney Morgan, eds., The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995),
169 at 170. See also Richard S. Frase & Benjamin N. Berger, “Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota,
1978–2003” in Michael Tonry, ed.,Crime & Justice, A Review of Research, vol. 32 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004) 131 at 141, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=623281>.
112. Supra note 24 at 61.
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tencing has discriminated against the indigenous community.113 Zdenkowski states
that, although there is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of the mandatory-sen-
tencing regime, there is no unequivocal evidence either way.114 However, Tonry
claims that there is significant evidence that mandatory penalties do not have the
desired effect on crime reduction.115
In commenting upon the Northern Territory’s mandatory minimum
imprisonment laws for property offenders,116 Flynn noted that offenders have
been treated very harshly, resulting in imprisonment for trivial property offences,
such as stealing a can of beer, breaking a light and pouring water onto an elec-
tronic cash register. He claims the legislation potentially violates Australia’s
human-rights obligations.117
As Zeleznikow notes, the development of our legal decision support sys-
tems has led to:
• Consistency—as, by replicating the manner in which decisions are made,
decision support systems are encouraging the spreading of consistency
in legal decision-making;
• Transparency—as, by demonstrating how legal decisions are made,
legal decision support systems are leading to a better community under-
standing of legal domains and as this has the desired benefit of decreas-
ing the level of public criticism of judicial decision-making;
• Efficiency—as one of the major benefits of decision support systems is
to make firms and organizations more efficient; and 
• Enhanced support for dispute resolution—as users of legal decision sup-
port systems are aware of the likely outcome of litigation and thus 
are encouraged to avoid the costs and emotional stress of legal pro-
ceedings.118
Despite protracted arguments about what is meant by consistency in
sentencing, there is universal acceptance that consistency of approach should be
an essential feature of sentencing decision-making. The Supreme Court of New
South Wales in R. v. Jurisic119 held that:
There is a need to ensure consistency in sentencing decisions. Inconsistency
offends the principle of equality before the law and is a manifestation of injus-
tice. Public criticism of particular sentences for inconsistency or excessive
leniency is sometimes justified. 
The English Court of Appeal has established a technique of guideline judg-
ments, in which the Court formulates general principles and, sometimes, gives
an indication of appropriate range to guide trial courts. 
113. Louis Schetzer, “A Year of Bad Policy: Mandatory Sentencing in the Northern Territory” (1998) 23:3
Alternative Law Journal 117 at 118.
114. Supra note 24 at 61.
115. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 140.
116. See Sentencing Act 1995 (N.T.), ss. 78(A) and 78(B) for persons 17 years and over, <http://www.austlii.edu.
au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/sa121/>. 
117. Martin Flynn, “Fixing a Sentence: Are there any Constitutional Limits” (1999) 22:1 U.N.S.W.L.J. 280 at
284ff.
118. Zelenikow & Stranieri, “A framework”, supra note 64.
119. Supra note 40 at 216 per Spigelman CJ.
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This Court has frequently stated principles of general application with respect
to appropriate sentences for particular offences.… 
The formal step of issuing guideline judgments is a logical development of
what the Court has long done. Such judgments may reinforce public confi-
dence in the integrity of the process of sentencing[.] 
Guideline judgments should now be recognised in New South Wales as hav-
ing a useful role to play in ensuring that an appropriate balance exists
between the broad discretion that must be retained to ensure that justice is
done in each individual case, on the one hand, and the desirability of consis-
tency in sentencing and the maintenance of public confidence in sentences
actually imposed, and in the judiciary as a whole, on the other. 
Such guidelines are intended to be indicative only. They are not intended to
be applied in every case as if they were rules binding on sentencing judges.
Guideline judgments are a mechanism for structuring discretion not restrict-
ing discretion. 
This project has developed a technological tool to help human decision-
makers achieve consistency in their approach to sentencing. By doing so, we
hope that arguments for more extreme sentencing restrictions on the judiciary,
such as mandatory sentencing regimes, are diminished. Intelligent legal decision
support systems can also act in the service of justice by promoting transparency
in decision-making.
Support systems that offer useful and accurate advice about sentencing,
can, if made available to the wider community, contribute to public confidence in
the legal system and to a more just society. Decision transparency—that is, demon-
strating how legal decisions are arrived at—can also be improved, thus promoting
better community understanding of the law and reducing public criticism.120
Decision support systems also have a capacity to assist in negotiation
(by providing an indicative range of outcomes and identifying areas of difference)
and in support training and potentially may enable those involved in the legal
system to be provided with accessible and cost-effective advice as to potential
outcomes. As mentioned previously Zeleznikow, Stranieri and Sourdin have
received further funding through an Australian Research Council grant to extend
the models reported in this paper and to build a prototype application. Part of
the project involves modelling negotiations between the Office of Public
Prosecution and the barristers of defendants who plead guilty to criminal
charges. Negotiations are conducted with respect to both the plea and sentenc-
ing suggestions.
120. John Zeleznikow, “Building Intelligent Legal Decision Support Systems: Past Practice and Future
Challenges” in J.A. Fulcher & L.C. Jain, eds., Applied Intelligent Systems: New Directions (Berlin: Springer
Verlag, 2004) 201 at 203.
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3.2. Caveat/Limitations 
Although the benefits that this technology provides are clearly evident, there are
also associated risks and disadvantages that require acknowledgement and care-
ful management. The responsibility and independence of the decision-maker
may be threatened and human staff may become deskilled or even redundant.
Sometimes there is a conflict of interest between different stakeholders and the
systems support some users better than others. They may mislead the user as to
the status of the knowledge contained in the system. Thus, the user needs to
know exactly which questions are answered by the system and its limitations.
Consistency and control may not always be the desired outcomes of using
an intelligent decision support system and they may be disadvantageous, particu-
larly when users are regulated by its use. When automated systems are used to
enforce legislation, they may regulate the behaviour of users by enforcing consis-
tency and standardization—that is, by controlling how a decision is made and how
users conduct their work tasks.121 The ability of a human decision-maker to intro-
duce an element of humanity in special circumstances is compromised. 
Sometimes this standardization of user behaviour is intended and at
other times it is just an inadvertent by-product, which may or may not be recog-
nized by the system developers, as it may only become apparent when the sys-
tem is operational. It is important that such regulatory effects should at least be
identified during an ex ante evaluation process. The standardization and consis-
tency enforced by a decision support system can provide a control mechanism
for those in power, permitting their power to be increased by ensuring that their
provisions are carried out absolutely.122 This automated enforcement could
replace an ouster clause in legislation and thus prevent judicial interpretation of
the law, which could, in turn, effect a redistribution of the constitutional balance
of power. According to Whitby, there is a benefit when the judiciary is seen to
some extent to be in conflict with the legislature, as this supports the constitu-
tional requirement for the various organs of authority to act as checks on each
other. By attempting to create an aura of certainty, the use of automated judicial
decision support may upset this fine balance.123
Schild considers it inappropriate for computers to make legal decisions
and recommends that their use in legal decision-making should, rather, be con-
fined to a support role assisting human decision-makers in their work.124
Zeleznikow concurs with this view.125
Susskind in his published essay, “The computer judge: Early thoughts,”
explores the issue further.126 He reports on a conversation between John
121. Anja Oskamp & Maaike Tragter, “Automated Legal Decision Systems in Practice: The Mirror of Reality”
(1997) 5 A.I. & L. 291 at 291, 312.
122. Blay Whitby, “AI and the Law: Proceed With Caution” in Mervyn E. Bennun, ed., Computers, Artificial
Intelligence and the Law, (Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood, 1991) 4 at 7–8.
123. Ibid. at 9.
124. Uri Schild, Expert Systems and Case Law (Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood, 1992) at 16, 20.
125. Supra note 120 at 204.
126. Richard E. Susskind, Transforming the Law: Essays on Technology, Justice and the Legal Marketplace
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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McCarthy, the early artificial intelligence pioneer, and Joseph Weizenbaum,
reported in 1984. McCarthy posed the question, “What do judges know that we
cannot tell a computer?” and answered “Nothing,” concluding that the goal of
“building machines for making judicial decisions was perfectly in order.”127 Like
Schild, Zeleznikow and others, Susskind strongly disagrees with this view. He
points out the limitations of current computer technology in the areas of speech
recognition, understanding pictures and natural language description. He notes
that computers have not yet been programmed to “exhibit moral, religious,
social, sexual and political preferences akin to those actually held by human
beings, [we] expect…of judges….” nor the “creativity, craftsmanship, individual-
ity, innovation, inspiration, intuition, commonsense and general interest in our
world we expect of judges.”128 Essentially he is saying that computers are not
human, but that judges are. He concludes that:
Computers will no doubt provide valuable assistance to the judiciary in the
future, [but] it is neither possible now (or in the conceivable future) nor desir-
able ever (as long as we accept the values of Western liberal democracy) that
computers assume the judicial function.129
*
4. CONCLUSION
THOMAS CLAIMS THAT POLITICAL and public interest in sentencing is at a high
level, though often public understanding of the realities of sentencing is limited
and often judges are criticised for excesses of leniency and severity, in many
instances in the same case.130 Total consistency in the exercise of discretion by
sentencers will never be achieved while humans have to make the decisions, but
a mechanical appearance of consistency such as can be produced by too rigid
guidelines is as capable of producing injustice. 
Sir Samuel Romilly wrote an excellent summary of the goal of producing
consistency in sentencing. He expressed the hope that “there might be, if not a
perfect uniformity in the administration of justice, yet the same spirit always pre-
vailing and the same maxims kept in view...”131
Our sentencing decision support system can help promote consistency
and transparency. 
If it is considered inappropriate for an intelligent sentencing decision
support system to make sentencing decisions, what then are the potential ben-
efits of the outcomes of the sentencing project? The web-enabled sentencing
models are designed to provide automated support for human decision-makers
127. Ibid. at 286.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. David A. Thomas, “Judicial discretion in sentencing” in Loraine Gelsthorpe & Nicola Padfield, eds.,
Exercising Discretion: Decision-making in the criminal justice system and beyond (Cullompton, Devon:
Willan Publishing, 2003), 50 at 71.
131. Sir William Staunford, Les Plees del Coron and Sir Samuel Romilly, Observations on the Criminal Law of
England (New York: Garland,1978) at 16.
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rather than to automate decision-making. This distinction is vital. “We should stress
that any legal decision support systems should be used as tools for legal decision-
makers; it would be most inappropriate for them to make legal decisions.”132
The main potential benefit of the sentencing project is in supporting the
training of judges, magistrates, legal counsel and law students. The models pro-
mote a clearer understanding of the factors affecting judicial decision-making
and, going beyond their potential as training tools, they provide a sound basis
for discussion for those responsible for the task of reviewing sentencing guide-
lines. The models also assist counsel preparing to plead a case by reminding
them in a structured manner of the factors that the sentencing decision-maker
will consider, thus ensuring that all relevant factors are included in their argu-
ments. The decision support system described in this paper offers direct bene-
fits to the judiciary beyond training. It can assist a judicial decision-maker to
identify relevant factors presented or not presented in counsel’s arguments and
provides a check-list or aide-mémoire when the decision-maker is preparing his
or her judgment.
Sentencing studies typically focus on sentencing statistics, but this study
is different because the emphasis is on the identification of the factors con-
tributing to the sentencing decision and the relationships among them. It has
been demonstrated that, despite apparent complexities, sentencing reasoning
can be effectively modelled as a series of simple interlocking arguments. Such a
series of models is the basis for an automated decision support system devel-
oped using both conventional and artificial-intelligence techniques. 
The sentencing decision support system in this discretionary domain is
complex and has a potential to have a significant impact. It is thus unsuitable for
total automation and should remain within human control. Whereas automated
decision-making is inappropriate, automated decision support is of benefit to
decision-makers, to legal professionals who work in discretionary legal domains
and the public alike. 
*
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